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On January 1, 2006 Medicare part D expanded, giving prescription coverage to many Americans. 
This event offers an interesting question regarding market efficiency, specifically because 
Medicare expansion was introduced into congress as far back as 1999. Because Medicare part D 
affected pharmaceutical drug coverage, this study focuses specifically on securities in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Following an efficient market hypothesis, we would expect to see 
significant abnormal returns in the post event window, anticipating the legislations effect on 
demand within the industry. Results showed significant abnormal returns in post-event window, 
but not in the pre-event window. The returns in the post-event window were both statically and 
economically significant. This suggests that most of the abnormal returns stemmed from a reaction 
after the implementation instead of anticipating the implementation.  
 






1 Powell is a Master of Financial Economics student in the Jon M. Huntsman School of Business at Utah State 
University. Email: spencerbrianpowell@gmail.com.  
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1. Introduction  
Medicare part D is a section of coverage that pays for self-administered prescription drugs for 
Medicare beneficiaries, controlled by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS). Other 
sections of Medicare have covered some prescription medications, though not completely. For example, 
Medicare part B covers professionally administered prescription medications. Some part C plans also 
included coverage of prescription drugs; however, this plan was required to be bundled with parts A and B. 
Part D was drafted as a comprehensive solution to the rapidly rising costs of prescription drugs. Over the 
period between 1980-2005, prescription drug costs rose at an annual rate of 11.9%, making them the third 
fastest growing cost of health care. Between 2000 and 2005 prescription drug costs rose at an annual rate 
of 10.7%, the fastest growing cost of healthcare.2 The pharmaceutical industry is massive, the Department 
of Health and Human Services has estimated that Americans spent more than $460 billion on drugs, 
accounting for 16.7 percent of total health-care spending. Medicare part D is available to all consumers that 
have Medicare coverage under part A & B, allowing many users to have reasonable access to coverage. 
Medicare beneficiaries are also one of the largest users of prescription medication in the United States, with 
“almost 60 percent of all prescriptions … filled for beneficiaries of Medicare, Medicaid, and other 
government programs” (Duggand, 2010). Part D would fill the gap that part C created by allowing 
standalone plans that covered prescription drugs. Part D was able to fill the gap due to a change in the 
coverage payments made to medical service providers. In parts A&B, CMS had the ability to set prices for 
each covered service and then reimbursed providers for each service performed. Part D, however, CMS 
pays a lump sum into a plan for each enrolled customer and then has no control over the prices paid to the 
pharmaceutical companies. This, in some ways, allows pharmaceutical prices to continue to inflate because 
the insurance has minimal influence on the price of the prescription medication.  
  The legislation to enact part D was in the process of being implemented for many years before it 
was ratified. Originally proposed in 1999 by President Clinton, the bill was subsequently proposed in 2002 
 
2 See the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2007. 
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and 2003 by both Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. House and the Senate as well as by President 
George W. Bush. The bill was formally enacted in 2003 as part of the Medicare modernization act of 2003, 
eventually going into effect on January 1, 2006. The ratification of Medicare part D poses an interesting 
question regarding the efficiency of markets surrounding policy changes that impact large segments of the 
overall market. The change to this legislation allows a unique glimpse into the efficiency of the market 
because the information regarding this change, in some form or another, was known by the public. The 
market should have expected increased profits from the pharmaceutical industry because transforming cash 
paying customers into insured customers has been shown to create inelastic demand for healthcare products, 
therefore lifting prices (Duggand, 2006; Pavcnik, 2002). Because of the size of the healthcare industry, 
this inelastic demand expectation should have had a positive impact on the prices of these securities when 
the change was announced and was put into the process of being implemented. 
The Medicare part D expansion should have also changed physicians’ attitudes towards prescribing 
brand name medication. Reichert (2000) looked at attitudes towards prescribing medication compared to 
their knowledge of the costs of the medication, and found that  
“88% of physicians felt the cost of medicines was an important consideration in the prescribing 
decision, and 71% were willing to sacrifice some degree of efficacy to make drugs more affordable 
for their patients…  94% of physicians gave strong consideration to the cost of medication when 
patents were self-paying, [only] 68% [gave cost consideration] when patients had Medicare, and 
30% when patients had Medicaid or were participants in a health maintenance organization with 
a prescription plan.”   
This known behavior should have signaled to the market that once this change was implemented, many 
doctors would be more willing to prescribe name brand medications to their patients.  
Alternatively, Hellerstein (1998) investigated data showing that in 1989 fewer than 30% of 
prescriptions with generic and name brand options prescribed the former. The study found that 
physicians' knowledge of patients' insurance coverage had no impact on the prescriber's choice between 
generic and name brand medication. Ultimately, the only physicians at the time using price in the 
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decision to prescribe were HMO-affiliated physicians and clinics. Mainly coming from cost 
management restrictions placed on physicians and clinics. 
To determine if the implementation of Medicare Part D had any impact on the performance of 
pharmaceutical stocks, we collected price and volume information from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP). Our analysis shows that pharmaceutical securities had statistically and 
economically significant returns in multiple event windows surrounding and directly after the January 
3, 2006 event date. Our analysis shows that industry had minimal abnormal returns in the pre-event 
period. 
2. Hypothesis Development 
Government programs and monetary policy changes have been shown to influence the returns of 
stocks. Specifically, monetary policy has been shown to significantly affect stock returns in 13 OECD 
countries between 1972-2002 (Ioannidis 2003). In other segments of the economy government spending 
has also been shown to increase the output, hours, and consumption of defense products (Fisher 2010). This 
shows that the government has significant ability to influence demand and prices through spending. Another 
study looking at the effect of government spending on consumption showed that government spending 
increases aggregate consumption for over a year after a spending shock, further showing the ability of the 
U.S. government to affect supply and demand (Laumer, 2020). Showing that government intervention has 
a significant impact on the behavior of consumers, especially in financial markets. Studies also point to 
increased price inelasticity between insured consumers and prescription drugs. Mendoza (2020) points to 
an incentive for price-substitution to risky and illegal drugs among people losing dependent coverage for 
medication. Mendoza also found that pharmaceutical innovation and advancement can cause product-
hopping and may result in sharp price increases. This favors a broad range of pharmaceutical 
companies, DiMasi (2000) found that between 1963 and 1999 “Innovation in the pharmaceutical 
industry is widely dispersed and has become less concentrated over time”. The paper also showed while 
there has been high turnover in innovation contributing firms over time, some firms have consistently 
5 
 
maintained high levels of innovation over long periods. This shows that price spikes and increased demand 
due to product hopping could benefit any firm in the industry and is not reserved for larger companies.   
At the time of the Medicare expansion, literature pointed to increasing inelastic demand, with prices 
increasing 7-10 percent for every 10 percent increase in consumers of the medication being covered by 
Medicare (Duggand, 2006). In a study involving diabetics before and after the 2006 part D expansion, they 
found that treatment of symptoms crowded out prevention of diabetes. The study showed that before the 
part D expansion, roughly 13% - 25% of female diabetics who used insulin stopped using insulin to manage 
their condition when they turned 65, thus becoming eligible for Medicare insurance. Because Medicare 
would cover the treatment of the symptoms from diabetes for a lower cost compared to preventing the 
symptoms with the more expensive insulin. After the implementation of Medicare part D this was 
effectively reduced to zero because the means to prevention were economically available to diabetics 
(Kaliski 2020). This, combined with cost conscious prescription writers discussed in Reichert (2000), shows 
that increased coverage should directly influence the volume of prescription drugs prescribed to and used 
by patients. The arguments above lead to the following two hypotheses: 
H0: The prices of pharmaceutical securities have no significant abnormal returns compared 
to the overall market in any CARs event window.  
H1: The prices of pharmaceutical stocks have positive returns around the event date in 
anticipation of increased profitability for pharmaceutical companies.   
 
3. Data Description 
3.1. Data Description 
To determine if the implementation of Medicare Part D had any impact on the performance of 
pharmaceutical stocks, we collected price and volume information from the Center for Research in 
Securities Prices (CRSP). In particular, we gathered information from securities within the pharmaceutical 
industry, four-digit SIC codes 2830 to 2836, because the legislation had direct implication on the 
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profitability of the industry. Table 1 reports summary statistics for the 335 publicly traded pharmaceutical 
companies with positive trading volume on January 3, 2006, the first trading day after the implementation 
of part D on January 1, 2006. The descriptive variables are the total for the single event date.  
Table 1. Cross-Sectional Summary Statistics 
This table reports summary statistics that describe the sample of pharmaceutical stocks on January 3, 2006. Price 
is the closing share price. MCAP is the market capitalization, or price times shares outstanding. Rvolt is the range-
based volatility, or the log of the high ask price minus the log of the low bid price. %Spread is the closing relative 
spread, or the difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Illiq is Amihud’s 
(2002) illiquidity, or absolute return divided by dollar volume (scaled by 106). Turn is share turnover, or volume 
divided by shares outstanding. Nasdaq is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ 
and zero otherwise.  
 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 
Price 335 15.6021 19.1243 3.1900 8.0600 20.0000 
MCAP 335 4.0784 18.1850 0.0721 0.2293 0.7752 
Rvolt 335 0.0504 0.0386 0.0284 0.0408 0.0607 
Spread 335 0.0088 0.0168 0.0007 0.0036 0.0087 
Illiq 335 1.2393 11.6869 0.0009 0.0099 0.1013 
Turn 335 0.0095 0.0128 0.0021 0.0054 0.0120 
Nasdaq 335 0.7463 0.4358 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
 
 
 The observed companies have an average price of $15.60, with a standard deviation of $19.12. 
The lower quartile of companies had a price of $3.19, with the upper quartile having a price of $20.00. The 
securities in the sample had market capitalizations from $72.1 million in the lower quartile to $775.2 million 
in the upper quartile. The standard deviation for MCAP is $18.185 billion, showing that while most of the 
data has a value of less than $1 billion, there are major outliers that pull the average of $4.078 billion away 
from the median value of $229.3 million. Volatility, measured as the log difference in daily high and low 
prices (Alizadeh, Brandt, and Diebold, 2002), is recorded as an average of 5.04% on the day the sample 
was taken. With a standard deviation of 3.86%, there are significant differences in the volatility of the 
securities we observed. The lower quartile of observations had a volatility of 2.84% while the upper quartile 
had a volatility of 6.07%, the median value was 4.08%. This shows that the data is positively skewed 
regarding volatility. A measure of the average transaction cost per trade for securities in the sample was 
obtained from the difference in the daily closing bid and ask prices, divided by the midpoint price. This is 
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denoted as the spread (see Chung and Zhang, 2014). The average closing spread is 8 basis points. The 
spread has a standard deviation of 16.8 basis points, this shows considerable change in the closing spread 
within the data. The lower quartile has a spread of 0.7 basis points while the upper quartile has a spread of 
8.7 basis points. Again, we see positive skewness in the data. Liquidity, measured with Amihud’s (2002) 
illiquidity, shows a rating of liquidity for a security. Low Amihud scores are associated with liquid 
securities. The average score is 1.2393, comparing this with the lower quartile, with a score of 0.0009, the 
median 0.0099, and the upper quartile 0.1013 we see that most securities are liquid with only a handful of 
observations bringing the average and standard deviation upwards. The average share turnover is 0.95% for 
stocks in the sample, turnover ranges from 0.21% in the bottom quartile to 1.20% in the upper quartile of 
the distribution.  With a standard deviation of 1.28%, the distribution is positively skewed. We also find 
that 74.63% of the securities are listed on the NASDAQ, this listing would increase analyst coverage and 
awareness of the security.  
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Table 2. Cross-Sectional Correlation Matrix 
This table reports correlation coefficients for the variables used in the cross-sectional analysis for the sample of 335 pharmaceutical 
stocks on January 3, 2006. Price is the closing share price. MCAP is the market capitalization, or price times shares outstanding. 
Rvolt is the range-based volatility, or the log of the high ask price minus the log of the low bid price. %Spread is the closing relative 
spread, or the difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Illiq is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, 
or absolute return divided by dollar volume (scaled by 106). Turn is share turnover, or volume divided by shares outstanding. 
Nasdaq is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ and zero otherwise. We report p-values in 
brackets. 
 
 Price MCAP Rvolt Spread Illiq Turn Nasdaq 
Price 1       
        
MCAP 0.4349 1      
 (<.0001)       
Rvolt -0.2869 -0.1416 1     
 (<.0001) (0.0095)      
Spread -0.2941 -0.1107 0.3785 1    
 (<.0001) (0.0429) (<.0001)     
Illiq -0.0587 -0.0238 -0.0589 0.2575 1   
 (0.2843) (0.6647) (0.2820) (<.0001)    
Turn 0.1444 -0.0567 0.1009 -0.0460 -0.0396 1  
 (0.0081) (0.3011) (0.0650) (0.4016) (0.4701)   
Nasdaq -0.1982 -0.2616 0.1420 -0.0156 0.0083 0.18388 1 





Table 2 shows the correlation coefficients for each variable used in the cross-sectional analysis.  
Each variable is compared to one another independently, displaying the percent of one variable that explains 
the outcomes of another. This aids in the avoidance of perfect multicollinearity in the OLS regression 
performed later on in the analysis. Price is heavily correlated with MCAP, Rvolt, Spread, Turn, and Nasdaq 
with values of 43.49%, -28.69%, -29.41%, 14.44%, and -19.82% respectively. MCAP, Rvolt, spread, and 
Nasdaq are each significant to the 99.99% level. Turn is also highly statistically significant at a 99% level. 
Illiq is the only variable that is not statistically significant with a value of -5.87% and a significance of 
71.57%. MCAP is highly correlated with Nasdaq with a value of 26.16% at a significance of 99.99%. It is 
correlated with Rvolt at a -14.16% level with a significance of 99%. Spread is also correlated with a value 
of -11.07% at a significance of 95%. Every other variable is neither statistically nor economically 
significant when compared to MCAP. The correlation between Rvolt and Spread is highly statistically 
significant, with a coefficient of 37.85% and a significance of 99.99%. Nasdaq is also highly significant 
with a value of 14.20% at a significance of 99%. Turnover is correlated with a value of 10.09% at a 
significance of 90%. Illiq is neither statistically nor economically significant to this variable. Spread is 
highly statistically significant on Illiq, with a value of 25.75% and a significance of 99.99%. Turn and 
Nasdaq are neither statistically nor economically significant. Illiq is also not highly significant compared 
to Turn and Nasdaq. Finally, Turn and Nasdaq are highly statistically significant. With a value of 18.39% 
and a significance level of 99%. 
4. Empirical Analysis and Results  
4.1. CARs surrounding Medicare Part D Expansion 
Our empirical analysis begins by looking at both raw returns and CARs for the sample of 335 
pharmaceutical stocks surrounding the January 3, 2006 implementation of the Medicare Part D. We note 
that the actual implementation date for Medicare part D was January 1, 2006, however, the markets were 
closed on that date making January 3 the first trading day following the event.  
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Table 3. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Surrounding Medicare Part D Expansion 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns for 335 pharmaceutical stocks surrounding the expansion of 
Medicare Part D on January 3, 2006. The market adjusted return (MAR) on day t is determined as follows:  
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  , 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (E-W) or value 
weighted (V-W) across CRSP securities on day t. We also obtain parameter estimates from restricted (market 
model) an unrestricted (4-factor model) specifications of the following model that is estimated in the period ending 
46 days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  
where 𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the market risk premium, the return on the market, either E-W or V-W across CRSP securities 
on day t minus the risk-free return. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the high minus low book-to-market risk factor. SMB is the small minus 
large market capitalization risk factor. UMD is the winners minus losers momentum risk factor. The first two risk 
factors are discussed in Fama and French (1993), while the last is outlined in Carhart (1997). We then estimate the 
abnormal returns for each stock day during the event window (AR) as follows: 
𝐹𝐹4 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡]. 
The raw returns and abnormal returns are cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 





E-W MM V-W MM E-W FF4 V-W FF4 
[-2, +2] 3.08%*** 0.91%** 1.59%*** 0.82%* 1.76%*** 1.15%** 2.15%*** 
 (7.992) (2.352) (4.139) (2.085) (4.496) (2.928) (5.513) 
[-5, +5] 6.37%*** 2.26%*** 3.98%*** 2.16%*** 4.26%*** 2.40%*** 3.99%*** 
 (10.246) (3.641) (6.399) (3.384) (6.730) (3.752) (6.236) 
[-10, +10] 7.81%*** 3.74%*** 6.46%*** 3.95%*** 6.71%*** 4.11%*** 6.09%*** 
 (8.533) (4.093) (7.056) (4.068) (6.958) (4.233) (6.266) 
[-15, +15] 7.85%*** 2.20%* 5.98%*** 2.55%* 6.34%*** 2.78%* 5.10%*** 
 (6.733) (1.888) (5.128) (2.046) (5.125) (2.222) (4.072) 
[-20, +20] 12.02%*** 4.04%** 8.86%*** 4.45%** 9.40%*** 4.64%*** 7.61%*** 
  (9.039) (3.044) (6.664) (3.079) (6.606) (3.204) (5.260) 
 
 
Column [1] of Table 3 shows cumulative raw returns. We find that the average cumulative return 
from day t-2 to t+2 is 3.08%, which is significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level. When the event 
window was expanded to t-5 to t+5 the return more than doubled to 6.37% and remained statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. Another expansion of the event window between t-10 and t+10 increased our 
raw return to 7.81% at a significance level of 0.01. The event window of t-15 to t+15 stays close to the 
previous window with a return of 7.85% at a significance level of 0.01. The final observed window of t-20 
to t+20 shows a return of 12.02% at a significance of 0.01. This shows that investors were optimistic about 
the impact Medicare expansion would have on pharmaceutical securities.  
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Although the raw returns look both statistically and economically significant, the raw return does 
nothing to control for the momentum of the overall market. Other factors driving the market upwards may 
have little to do with expectations of increased profits for pharmaceutical companies. In columns [2] 
through [7] of Table 3, we report results for CARs that are adjusted using a variety of benchmarks. Columns 
[2], [4], and [6] use an equal-weighted market portfolio as the benchmark. Column [2] subtracts the equal-
weighted market return from the event return. Column [4] takes the residual return from a market model 
regression where the event return is regressed on the equal-weighted market return. Column [6] reports 
additional robust results from a four-factor model, where CARs are estimated using the residuals from these 
multifactor models. Columns [3], [5], and [7] are analogous to columns [2], [4], and [6] but use a value-
weighted market return instead of an equal-weighted return. Overall, the results tell a similar story to the 
raw returns. As the event window widened from the smallest window, t-2 to t+2, towards the largest 
window, t-20 to t+20, the abnormal return tended to increase by more than 2x. Even the smallest abnormal 
return, found in column [4] during the event window t-2 to t+2, returned 0.82% and was statistically 
significant at the 90% level. Following the same column to the event window of t-20 to t+20 we find an 
abnormal return of 4.45% with a statistical significance of 95%. Because this trend is followed in every 
column for each event window, regularly with a significance of 99%, we can conclude that there is a positive 





4.2. CARs after Medicare Part D Expansion 
 
Table 4. Cumulative Abnormal Returns After Medicare Part D Expansion 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns for 335 pharmaceutical stocks after the expansion of Medicare Part 
D on January 3, 2006. The market adjusted return (MAR) on day t is determined as follows:  
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  , 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (E-W) or value 
weighted (V-W) across CRSP securities on day t. We also obtain parameter estimates from restricted (market 
model) an unrestricted (4-factor model) specifications of the following model that is estimated in the period ending 
46 days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  
where 𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the market risk premium, the return on the market, either E-W or V-W across CRSP securities 
on day t minus the risk-free return. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the high minus low book-to-market risk factor. SMB is the small minus 
large market capitalization risk factor. UMD is the winners minus losers momentum risk factor. The first two risk 
factors are discussed in Fama and French (1993), while the last is outlined in Carhart (1997). We then estimate the 
abnormal returns for each stock day during the event window (AR) as follows: 
𝐹𝐹4 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡]. 
The raw returns and abnormal returns are cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 





E-W MM V-W MM E-W FF4 V-W FF4 
[0, +2] 2.86%*** 0.70%** 0.70%** 0.56%* 0.91%*** 0.58%* 1.07%*** 
 (7.975) (1.963) (1.961) (1.571) (2.562) (1.642) (2.996) 
[0, +5] 6.64%*** 2.46%*** 2.98%*** 2.19%*** 3.34%*** 1.99%*** 2.95%*** 
 (11.853) (4.383) (5.310) (3.922) (5.979) (3.582) (5.289) 
[0, +10] 8.00%*** 3.95%*** 5.26%*** 3.85%*** 5.57%*** 3.84%*** 5.10%*** 
 (10.143) (5.014) (6.670) (4.762) (6.935) (4.759) (6.331) 
[0, +15] 7.88%*** 2.59%*** 5.46%*** 2.51%*** 5.77%*** 3.25%*** 4.60%*** 
 (8.494) (2.796) (5.886) (2.625) (6.112) (3.370) (4.771) 
[0, +20] 11.53%*** 3.96%*** 7.42%*** 3.79%*** 7.91%*** 4.60%*** 6.47%*** 




In order to determine the market sentiment towards pharmaceutical stocks with the expansion of 
Medicare part D, it is necessary to view CARs event windows during and after the event. We should expect 
to see somewhat positive returns once the plan is implemented. This is what we find when looking at CAR 
event windows taking place during and after the event, shown in Table 4. In column [1], for event windows 
t 0 to t + 2 we report raw returns of 2.86%. In event windows t 0 to t + 5, t 0 to t + 10,  t 0 to t + 15, and  t 
0 to t + 20 we report raw returns of 6.64%, 8.00%, 7.88%, and 11.53% respectively. Each raw return is also 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
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This trend continues throughout columns [2] to [7], with the lowest abnormal return being column 
[4] during the event window t 0 to t + 2, which reported an equal weighted market model abnormal return 
of 0.56% with a 90% significance level. Every value in event windows t 0 to t + 5, as well as every larger 
event window, are both economically significant as well as statistically significant to the 0.01 level. Value 
weighting the models caused larger abnormal returns because the largest pharmaceutical companies often 
own the patents to many different drugs that would benefit from increased inelastic demand after the Part 
D expansion. In essence, these companies have more to gain from the increased coverage of the American 
people. Value weighted models, columns [3], [5], and [7], in the time period t 0 to t + 20 had abnormal 
returns of 7.42%, 7.91%, and 6.47%, respectively, while each value was statistically significant to 99%. 
Equal weight markets, columns [2], [4], and [6], in the same period of t 0 to t + 20 had reduced abnormal 
returns, though still economically significant. This outcome is expected as the market adjusted to the 




4.3. CARs before Medicare Part D Expansion 
 
Table 5. Cumulative Abnormal Returns Before Medicare Part D Expansion 
This table reports cumulative abnormal returns for 335 pharmaceutical stocks before the expansion of Medicare 
Part D on January 3, 2006. The market adjusted return (MAR) on day t is determined as follows:  
𝑀𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡  , 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return on stock i on day t and 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 is the market return either equal-weighted (E-W) or value 
weighted (V-W) across CRSP securities on day t. We also obtain parameter estimates from restricted (market 
model) an unrestricted (4-factor model) specifications of the following model that is estimated in the period ending 
46 days before the event date (maximum of 255 days and minimum of 3 days): 
𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡  
where 𝐸𝑋𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 is the market risk premium, the return on the market, either E-W or V-W across CRSP securities 
on day t minus the risk-free return. 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  is the high minus low book-to-market risk factor. SMB is the small minus 
large market capitalization risk factor. UMD is the winners minus losers momentum risk factor. The first two risk 
factors are discussed in Fama and French (1993), while the last is outlined in Carhart (1997). We then estimate the 
abnormal returns for each stock day during the event window (AR) as follows: 
𝐹𝐹4 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐸[𝑅𝑖,𝑡]. 
The raw returns and abnormal returns are cumulated (CARs) over various event windows. T-statistics are reported 
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 





E-W MM V-W MM E-W FF4 V-W FF4 
[-20, -1] 0.49% 0.08% 1.44%** 0.66% 1.49%** 0.04% 1.14%* 
 (0.584) (0.096) (1.731) (0.760) (1.701) (0.048) (1.303) 
[-15, -1] -0.04% -0.39% 0.51% 0.04% 0.57% -0.47% 0.51% 
 (-0.047) (-0.521) (0.680) (0.048) (0.711) (-0.590) (0.636) 
[-10, -1] -0.19% -0.21% 1.20%** 0.10% 1.14%** 0.28% 0.98%* 
 (-0.322) (-0.358) (2.067) (0.173) (1.880) (0.455) (1.610) 
[-5, -1] -0.27% -0.19% 1.00%*** -0.03% 0.92%*** 0.41% 1.03%*** 
 (-0.753) (-0.537) (2.798) (-0.072) (2.528) (1.100) (2.785) 
[-2, -1] 0.21% 0.20% 0.89%*** 0.26% 0.84%*** 0.56%*** 1.08%*** 
  (0.917) (0.862) (3.816) (1.118) (3.617) (2.408) (4.640) 
 
 
The pre-event window is expected to be relatively uneventful so long as there is minimal data 
leakage regarding the expansion of Medicare part D. Table 5 displays the results of the event windows 
preceding the Medicare expansion. Column [1] displays the raw returns for the pre-event windows. The 
raw return periods of t-20 to t-1, t-15 to t-1, t-10 to t-1, t-5 to t-1, and t-2 to t-1 all show returns lower than 
0.5%. Furthermore, none of these returns are statistically different from zero. The same story is shown for 
most returns in the pre-event windows. There are, however, a few instances of returns that are marginally 
economically significant as well as statistically significant. In column [3], the event window t-5 to t-1 and 
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t-2 to t-1 have returns of 1.00% and 0.89% respectively while also having a significance of 99%. In the 
same column the event windows t-20 to t-1 and t-10 to t-1 have returns of 1.44% and 1.20% respectively 
while also having a significance of 95%. In column [5], within the event windows of t-5 to t-1 and t-2 to t-
1 there is a return of 0.92% and 0.84% respectively. Both windows have a statistical significance of 99%. 
Within this same column but in the event windows of t-20 to t-1 and t-10 to t-1 there was a return of 1.49% 
and 1.14% respectively with a significance of 95%. Column [6] has only one statistically significant value, 
in the t-2 to t-1 event window we recorded an abnormal return of 0.56%. While this is arguably 
economically insignificant, it has a statistical significance of 99%. Column [6] follows a similar 
significance pattern found in columns [3] and [5]. Event windows t-5 to t-1 and t-2 to t-1 had an abnormal 
return of 1.03% and 1.08% respectively while having a significance of 99%. Windows t-20 to t-1 and t-10 
each returned 1.14% and 0.98% with a significance of 90%. These results follow the pattern formed in 
Table 4, where Value-Weighted models had larger returns compared to Equal-Weighted models. This, 
again, might be since larger pharmaceutical stocks received a premium in anticipation for the Medicare 
expansion.  
4.4. Cross-Sectional Regressions 
Table 6 reports the cross-sectional regressions for the post event windows, allowing a closer look 
at the characteristics of pharmaceutical stocks that lead to large abnormal returns. Over most of the 
regression event windows the factors contributing the most to abnormal returns are low priced, high volume, 




Table 6. Cross-Sectional Regressions 
This table reports the results from estimating specifications of the following cross-sectional regression equation on 
a sample of 335 pharmaceutical stocks: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑁(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖) + 𝛽2𝐿𝑁(𝑀𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖) + 𝛽3𝑅𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽4%𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽5𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽7𝑁𝑎𝑠𝑑𝑎𝑞𝑖
+ 𝜀𝑖 
where the dependent variable is the market model cumulative abnormal return around the expansion of Medicare 
Part D. Price is the closing share price. MCAP is the market capitalization, or price times shares outstanding. Rvolt 
is the range-based volatility, or the log of the high ask price minus the log of the low bid price. %Spread is the 
closing relative spread, or the difference between the closing ask and bid prices, scaled by the quote midpoint. Illiq 
is Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity, or absolute return divided by dollar volume (scaled by 106). Turn is share turnover, 
or volume divided by shares outstanding. Nasdaq is an indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the 
NASDAQ and zero otherwise T-statistics are reported in parentheses obtained from heteroscedastic corrected 
standard errors. ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
  Event Window 
  [0, +2] [0, +5] [0, +10] [0, +15] [0, +20] 
LN(Price) -0.0041 -0.0236** -0.0376*** -0.0378** -0.0532*** 
 (-0.87) (-3.34) (-3.82) (-3.27) (-3.98) 
LN(MCAP) -0.0020 0.0020 0.0005 -0.0044 0.0040 
 (-0.69) (0.45) (0.08) (-0.61) (-0.48) 
Rvolt 0.0465 -0.0464 0.1460 0.1811 0.1603 
 (0.43) (-0.28) (0.63) (0.66) (0.51) 
Spread -0.2562 -0.0466 0.2430 0.5447 0.4874 
 (-0.94) (-0.11) (0.42) (0.80) (0.62) 
Illiq 0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.006 
 (1.69) (-0.72) (0.53) (-0.87) (-0.66) 
Turn 0.7604** 1.2946** 1.7579** 1.4640* 1.5844 
 (2.53) (2.83) (2.75) (1.95) (1.83) 
Nasdaq -0.0160 -0.0398** -0.0527** -0.0621** -0.0683 
 (-1.86) (-3.04) (-2.88) (-2.90) (-2.76) 
Constant 0.0607 0.0638 0.1369 0.2402 0.2903 
 (1.13) (0.78) (1.20) (1.79) (1.87) 
Adj. R2 0.0234 0.0742 0.1262 0.1323 0.1556 
N 335 335 335 335 335 
 
 
In the event window t 0 to t+2 share turnover was the only significant variable, with a significance 
of 95%, showing that securities with hih volume lead to abnormal returns. In the period t 0 to t+5 low price, 
high turnover, and NYSE listed securities all had significant influence on the abnormal return with a 95% 
significance. The event window t=0 to t+10 low price, high turnover and NYSE listing follows a similar 
trend of significance, with values of 99%, 95%, and 95% respectively. In the period t 0 to t + 15, the trend 
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of low price, high turnover and a NYSE listing continues, with those having the only statistically significant 
values with significance of 95%, 90%, and 95% respectively. Finally, the t 0 to t + 20 event window had 
low price as the only significant value, with a significance of 99%.  
5. Concluding Remarks 
On January 1, 2006 Medicare was expanded with part D to increase the availability of insurance 
coverage for consumers of prescription medication. With this expansion came the expectation that prices 
and demand for prescription medications would increase due to higher volumes of insured customers. Our 
findings lead us to reject H0 and accept H1 due to the highly significant, both economically and statistically, 
results of the CARs analysis. Our results found large abnormal returns in the post event window and 
minimal abnormal returns in the pre-event window, showing that implementing Medicare part D influenced 
the industry. Our analysis also showed that companies with low price, high volume, and a NYSE listing 
contributed significantly to the abnormal returns in the post event windows.  
Further research is needed to discover if the Medicare expansion had the lasting effect that investors 
expected. Existing literature, specifically Duggand (2010), found that prices of pharmaceutical medication 
decreased after the expansion. It would be worthwhile to look at the maximum length of time these 
securities held their expansion premium to discover when the markets realized that no significant increased 
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